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Abstract: This paper considers whether political business cycles exist in 
Eastern European accession countries. Section I introduces the overall objectives of 
the work. Section II provides a short introduction to the political business cycle 
literature. It also considers the role of exchange rates, capital mobility, and central 
bank independence in restricting or encouraging political business cycles. Section III 
lays out the accession process to date as well as the exchange rate regimes accession 
states have used. Section IV tests empirically whether there have been political 
business cycles during the time period 1990 to 1999 for the 10 Eastern European 
accession countries, with estimations based on a Mundell-Fleming model. It finds that 
countries with flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in election years 
than in non-election years in countries with dependent central banks. If a country has 
a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through 
running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. Section V 
concludes with some policy implications for the European Union’s enlargement 
process and EMU. 
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I. Introduction. 
 
 
The European Union is currently involved in accession negotiations with 
twelve Eastern European and Mediterranean countries.  Much focus has been given to 
the implications of this accession to a variety of European Union programs, such as 
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) or to the possible effects of greater labor 
mobility from the Accession Countries.  There has also been some recent discussion 
of how EU enlargement may affect Economic and Monetary Union (see Vinhas de 
Souza and Ledrut, 2000, Vinhas de Souza, 2000, Vinhas de Souza at al, 1999 and 
Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 1999).  While authors like De Grauwe and Aksoy 
(1999) argue in preliminary work that some of the applicant countries are already in 
principle part of an optimal currency area with the current members of the euroarea, 
which would imply that these countries could join EMU soon after they join the EU, 
while others, like the recent work by Vinhas de Souza and Ledrut (2000, ibid), casts 
doubts in such an optimistic view. The European Commission is also more cautious 
about the prospects of early EMU participation.  It has warned that accession states 
should not join EMU at the same time they join the EU because of possible 
disruptions to their economies, and also because of the very legal structure of the 
Enlargement process3. 
 
This paper considers whether political business cycles exist in Eastern 
European accession countries. Manipulation of the economy in election years is a 
common practice in most OECD countries, where budget deficits tend to become 
larger in election years and/or where monetary policy is looser than in non-election 
years. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe would have implications for the 
introduction of the Euro, both in terms of when the Euro should be introduced and 
what effects the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in its current form would have on 
the Accession Countries’ economies4. Section II provides a short introduction to the 
political business cycle literature.  It also considers the role of exchange rates, capital 
mobility, and central bank independence in restricting or encouraging political 
business cycles. Based on a Mundell-Fleming model, Clark and Hallerberg (2000) 
                                                 
3In its 1998 “Composite Paper”, which presents an integrated analysis of the assessment performed in 
the applicant countries, the European Commission’s phasing of EMU integration for future members 
envisage a three-phased process (See European Commission, 1998). The first is a pre-accession phase, 
during which the accession states shall fulfill general EU membership criteria. The second is the 
accession stage per se, in which the states, already in the EU but outside the Euroarea, shall 
nevertheless -according to the terms of the Treaty of the European Union, TEU- treat the “exchange 
policy as a matter of common interest” and eventually coordinate policy through a structure similar to 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The third and final phase is the actual Euro phase. This timing 
would explicitly exclude a simultaneous accession to the European Union and to the common currency 
framework, which is also implicit in the so-called Maastricht Criteria (see footnote 10). This clarifies 
the statements in the “Agenda 2000” (see EC, 1997), which, in principle, do not seem to exclude a two-
phased process, in which the entry in both the EU and the EMU could be simultaneous, and where no 
exchange rate coordination framework was actually specified. These statements were confirmed by the 
1999 version of the “Composite Paper”, which didn’t introduced any substantial modifications 
concerning EMU (see European Commission, 1999). 
4To try to impose a more binding constraint on the fiscal behavior of the member countries of the 
European Union, a system of punitive pecuniary fines was introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), through which –after a lengthy joint political decision process- individual EU member countries 
that incur in non-cyclical adjusted deficits that are deemed to be “excessive” –namely, over a 3% 
benchmark- would transfer up to 0.5% of their GDP to the Union. 
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indicate that the type of exchange rate regime affects the instruments governments use 
to influence the economy before elections.  Assuming that capital is mobile, if the 
country has fixed exchange rates, then only fiscal cycles are expected.  Conversely, if 
the country has flexible exchange rates then monetary cycles are expected.  
Independent central banks can eliminate such cycles even under flexible exchange 
rate regimes. Section III lays out the accession process to date as well as the exchange 
rate regimes accession states have used. Section IV tests empirically whether there 
have been political business cycles during the time period 1990 to 1999 for the 10 
Eastern European Accession Countries5. We find strong evidence in support of the 
theory—countries with flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in 
election years than in non-election years in countries with dependent central banks. If 
a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election 
years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. One 
finding that differs from Clark and Hallerberg (2000, ibid) is that, in countries with 
independent central banks, there is a monetary contraction in election years.  This 
suggests that newly created independent central banks may use electoral years to send 
signals to markets that they are truly independent. Section V concludes, and it 
considers the policy implications for the European Union’s enlargement process and 
EMU. 
 
                                                 
5Namely, the countries studied here will be Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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II. Political Business Cycles. 
 
 
The political business cycle literature considers how incumbent governments 
attempt to manipulate the macro-economy before elections. There have been in 
general two types of cycles reported in the literature. Partisan political business 
cycles occur when macro-economic policy varies consistently with the partisan hue of 
government.  The standard assumption is that left governments prefer higher rates of 
growth and therefore tolerate higher inflation rates and/or higher budget deficits than 
right governments (see Hibbs, 1977 and Oatley, 1999).  The governments are simply 
following the dictates of their core supporters, either labor for left governments or 
capital for right governments. While these arguments might makes intuitive sense, 
there is little empirical support for it. While Oatley (1999) finds that countries did 
experience such partisan cycles before the 1990’s, Clark and Hallerberg (2000, 
Ibiden) found no evidence of such partisan swings in terms of changes in monetary or 
fiscal policy in OECD countries. 
 
The second type of cycles, opportunistic political business cycles, have more 
empirical support, and they are the cycles on which we will focus our research (see 
Nordhaus, 1975, MacRae, 1977, Tufte, 1978 and Keech, 1995).  The basic 
assumption is that voters support incumbents when their economic position is healthy, 
but they support challengers when their economic position is weak. Governments 
therefore can gain votes if they can boost the economy shortly before elections.  
 
There are two crucial assumptions to the model that are potentially subject to 
criticism, and before testing the model we should consider them.  First, the model 
assumes that voters are short-sighted. They care only about their current economic 
position when they vote and do not factor in government manipulations of the 
economy and its future effects into their vote calculus. A second crucial assumption is 
tied to the first one, namely that governments can manipulate the economy. The 
Lucas critique contends that there is no such thing even as a short run Philips Curve 
which the government can exploit to boost output and jobs (see Lucas, 1976). Agents 
adjust their expectations based on the behavior of the government, and their adjusted 
behavior eliminates the positive effect of any manipulation of the economy. While 
this critique has been devastating to theories concerning long-run Philips curves, there 
is some empirical evidence that states do successfully manipulate the economy short-
term (see, among others, De Grauwe and Aksoy, 1999, ibid, and De Grauwe, 1997), 
and a short-term real effect is all a government would need before an election (with 
such short-sighted agents/voters). 
 
Exactly how governments boost the economy before elections is the subject of 
Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden). They consider the relevance of a standard 
Mundell-Fleming model for opportunistic political business cycles. The Mundell-
Fleming model factors in the role of both the level of capital mobility as well as the 
exchange rate in determining the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy 
in influencing the macro-economy. When capital is not mobile, both monetary and 
fiscal policies affect economic growth. When capital is mobile, the exchange rate 
becomes an important variable. If the exchange rate is fixed, monetary policy 
becomes an ineffective policy instrument, and fiscal policy is the only way that the 
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government can influence the macro-economy. The opposite is the case when the 
exchange rate is flexible—monetary policy is effective but fiscal policy is not. 
 
Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) apply this framework to discussions about 
the presence or absence of opportunistic political business cycles. They also consider 
the importance of domestic institutions in preventing opportunistic political business 
cycles. Independent central banks are expected to eliminate cycles even when capital 
is mobile and exchange rates are fixed. Independent central banks do not adjust policy 
according to the whims of the electoral calendar, while dependent central banks do. 
Clark and Reichert (1998) find evidence that independent central banks can block 
opportunistic changes in macro-economic variables, like economic growth, according 
to an electoral calendar. Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) find similar results for 
the importance of independent central banks based on changes in policy instruments 
such as the money supply. Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) also consider the 
effects of fiscal policy institutions. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998, 1999) find 
evidence that either delegation to a strong finance minister, or the setting of budget 
targets in the form of fiscal contracts among coalition partners reduces the size of 
budget deficits. Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) find that these institutions also 
reduce the size of opportunistic fiscal cycles when capital is mobile and the exchange 
rate is fixed, although fiscal contracts are more effective than delegation to a strong 
finance minister. 
 
In the empirical section of the paper we will concentrate on the effects of the 
exchange rate regime as well as independent central banks in reducing opportunistic 
political business cycles in Eastern Europe6. A summary of our predictions under 
conditions of capital mobility appears in Table 1 (below). 
 
 
Table 1: Predictions about the Effects of Exchange Rate Regime and Central 
Bank Independence on Opportunistic Political Business Cycles. 
 No Central Bank 
Independence 
Central Bank Independence 
 
Capital Mobility and Fixed 
Exchange Rates 
 
Fiscal Cycles, 
 
No Monetary Cycles 
 
Fiscal Cycles, 
 
No Monetary Cycles 
 
 
Capital Mobility and  
Flexible Exchange Rates 
 
 
Monetary Cycles, 
 
No Fiscal Cycles 
 
No Fiscal or 
 
Monetary Cycles 
 
Note: This Table also appears as Figure 2 in Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden). 
 
 
                                                 
6To date there is no published material on fiscal institutions in East Europe. 
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III.  The Accession Process and the AC’s Monetary and Exchange Rate 
Arrangements. 
 
 
 The European Commission, according to the provision of the Article O of the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU), launched, in March 31, 1998, official accession 
processes with Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia7, through the mechanisms of 
the Accession Partnerships8 (AP). According to the terms of a Luxembourg European 
Council decision, the pre-accession process and its related questions will be dealt with 
via the APs and the respective National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA), their counterparts at the accession-country level. 
 
 Substantive negotiations for Accession were opened on November 10, 1998, 
with Cyprus9, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, the so-called 
“first wave” countries. This set of countries was selected on the basis of their level of 
fulfillment of the economic and political criteria set out by the European Council held in 
Copenhagen in July 199310 as benchmarks for future member countries. These 6 former 
“first wave” entrants would add over 63 million inhabitants to the current Union’s 
population (almost two thirds of them in Poland alone) and over 240 Billion Euro to its 
GDP (again, over half of this figure in Poland). That will mean, respectively, a 17% 
increase in the Union population, but a mere 3% increase in its GDP. The so-called 
“second wave” entrants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) 
would add to these figures roughly another 57 million people and 97 Billion Euros (or a 
15% increase in the population of the Union, but an even more marginal increase of 
1.2% to its GDP). This, of course, reflects the lower level of development of the two 
biggest countries in this group, Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
This division was, in practical terms, ended by a series of new EU 
Commission’s recommendations, published in 13, October, 1999 (see European 
Commission, 1999). In a wide-ranging modification of the EU accession procedures 
and foreign policy –approved by a European Council meeting, held in Finland, in 
December 1999, substantial negotiations for accession are now to be opened with all 
application countries in 2000. Turkey was also added to the Application Countries’ 
list, but without any date for the opening of negotiations. The Balkans was added to 
the list of countries for eventual future integration. A new framework of cooperation 
is to be developed with all remaining EU-neighboring areas, from Eastern Europe to 
                                                 
7Malta was only added to this list in October of 1998, when the Council accepted Malta’s request to 
reactivate its candidature, which had been presented in 1990 but withdrawn following the change in 
government in the island after the general elections of 1996. A new government, elected in September 
of 1998, reverted this position. 
8See European Commission, 1998. 
9It must be noted that the specific political situation in Cyprus, namely, its division between a Greek 
Cypriot south and a Turkish-occupied north, casts doubts on the final outcome of the accession 
negotiations. 
10These criteria, know as “Copenhagen Criteria”, are that the new entrants should present: “i) stable 
institutions, guarantees the rule of the law, human rights and the protection of minorities; ii) can be 
regarded as a functioning market economy able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union in the medium term and iii) should be capable in the medium term of applying the 
Acquis provided it continues its efforts on its transposition and intensifies its works on its 
implementations”. See European Commission, 1998. 
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the Mediterranean Sea. The official opening of substantive negotiations for Accession 
with the new Accession Countries occurred on February 15, 2000, in Brussels, during 
the Portuguese presidency of the Union. 
 
 In number of countries this will be the biggest wave of expansion of the Union 
since its birth in 1957, surpassing the North Sea Accession of 1973 (the Kingdom of 
Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom), the Mediterranean 
Accession of 1982 (the Greek Republic), the Iberian Accession of 1986 (The Kingdom 
of Spain and the Portuguese Republic) and the Nordic-Central European Accession of 
1995 (the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden). 
The complexity and duration of the related negotiation process could perhaps equal -and 
even surpass- the almost 10 year long negotiations of the Iberian accessions (see Vinhas 
de Souza, 1996), at least for some of the countries. Such a prolonged pre-accession 
period is even more likely when one remembers that the comprehensiveness and 
extension of European legislation, and realms of integration which are included in the 
current negotiations, surpass by far the ones covered on all previous expansion waves. 
  
 In this negotiation process, there is one major institutional difference, among the 
many from the previous expansion waves, that shall concern us here: namely, that the 
new entrants cannot benefit from the use of “Opt-out” clauses, which were used by the 
United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Denmark for EMU (Economic and Monetary 
Union), and also by the UK for the Social Chapter. Therefore, the Acquis 
Communautaire is expected to be, in time, taken in full by all future new entrants, 
including, of course, EMU participation and all the requisite “Criteria”11. All future 
entrants are supposed to become, eventually but not immediately, members of the 
common currency area, which became a reality with the introduction of the Euro in 11 of 
                                                 
11A number of numerical benchmarks were defined in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty. These 
so-called EMU or Maastricht Convergence Criteria aim to ensure monetary and fiscal stability in the 
joint currency area. The criteria force the countries which want to become full EMU members to converge 
in the monetary and fiscal sphere. Two of the criteria are monetary, one is linked to currency rate stability, 
and the final one is fiscal. The criteria are: 
 
i) The Inflation Convergence Criterion, defined as an inflation rate which should not exceeds by 
more than 1.5% the average inflation rate of the three best-performing countries; 
ii) The Interest Rate Convergence Criterion, meaning that the average long-term nominal interest 
rate should not be more than 2% above the average interest rate of three countries with the 
lowest inflation rate; 
iii) The ERM Criterion, which postulates that the currencies of future EMU members should have 
been in the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) without devaluation or revaluation for at least 
two years11; 
iv) The Excessive Debt Criterion is composed of a budget deficit component, which declares that a 
country’s budget deficit should not exceed 3% of its GDP, and of a stock of debt component, 
which states that the stock of outstanding government debt should not exceed 60% of that 
country’s GDP (or otherwise be in a descending sustainable trajectory towards these 
benchmarks). 
 
Additionally, an “operational” criterion was also set, concerning the legal and institutional features of the 
national Central Bank (CB), namely, its independence from government interference, a mandate towards 
price stability, the prohibition of monetary financing of deficits, and the availability of a set of market-
based instruments that enable the CB to conduct monetary policy actions. 
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the 15 European Union (EU) member states, in January 199912. This is implicitly stated 
in the Amsterdam Treaty (AT), which declares that all future member countries “shall 
adhere to the goals of EMU”, and explicitly indicated by the general commitments in the 
pre-accession agreements signed by the new entrants with the European Commission. 
 
 Given this background, we will try to assess the question of the influence of the 
political cycle in the conduct of monetary policy. To do so, we will first determine the 
exchange rate regimes in place in the countries, and also consider the institutional 
structure of their domestic institutions, and in particular whether or not the countries 
have independent monetary authorities. 
 
 
Monetary Authorities in Central Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 As a general rule, most transition economies adopted, at some point early in their 
transition process, macroeconomic stabilisation programs13 with some form of exchange 
rate anchor. Most of these initial peg strategies where later abandoned or softened  in the 
face of growing external imbalances.  Such changes happened either relatively swiftly, 
as was the case in Poland, or spectacularly in the midst of a speculative attack, as was the 
case in the Czech Republic14.  
 
 It must be noted that the learning curve of these countries had to be very steep: 
hardly ten years ago, the currently universal two-tier bank structure was not only absent, 
but irrelevant. The central bank, for all practical purposes, was a department of the 
Ministry of Finance, and its only real function was to produce the means of exchange to 
allow the trading of plan-determined quantities among individual consumers15.  Several 
of these countries—namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia—were 
newly independent and had to build national institutions virtually from scratch, including 
their monetary authorities. 
 
 The development of the institutions able to carry out monetary policy actions, as 
well as the development of the necessary instruments to carry it through, took time. 
Initially, more blunt direct monetary control instruments were used (interest rate and 
credit caps, high reserve requirements, “moral persuasion”, etc.) since i) the monetary 
authorities themselves had not learned how to use modern monetary policy tools16,  ii) 
the transmission channels for the proper use of those tools–namely, working financial 
                                                 
12The founding members of the euroarea are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The currently non-participating member-states are 
Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Greece shall join the euroarea in January, 2000. 
13These macro programs encompassed, of course, several different policy actions. On the monetary side, 
one of the main initial concerns was the elimination of the monetary overhang: centrally planned 
economies traditionally generated a surplus of legal tender, given the limited amount of goods and 
services available for consumption. A substantial part of this overhang was held by households outside of 
the former mono-bank financial system. The liberalization of prices and external trade, besides the macro 
balance and allocative micro-efficiency issues involved, aimed at eliminating part of this surplus. 
14For a stylized description of the general trajectory, see Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997. 
15Among the state enterprises and government departments, not even this mean of exchange function of 
money was necessary: barter –inter-unit transfers of goods and services for settlement- was used 
instead. 
16Which, even in Western Europe, were only slowly and progressively introduced between the 1950s 
and the 1990s. 
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markets--were absent in these economies (and still are today, but to a much lesser 
degree) and iii) the lack of stable relationships among the central bank’s target variables 
and its instruments. Only more recently have market-based indirect monetary policy 
instruments–repos, lombard facilities, government securities auctions-been introduced17. 
 
A primary goal of a central bank is to maintain price stability. This can be 
accomplished through direct or indirect strategies. To try to meet a inflation target 
indirectly assumes some sort of stable links between the final target and an 
aggregate(s), which the central bank attempts to influence. These aggregates are the 
so-called intermediate targets, but inflation is the final target. There are two possible 
types of indirect strategies, one based on a stable rate of exchange between the 
domestic currency and the currency of a low inflation country, and the other based on 
controlling the growth rate of a domestic money supply aggregate.  The use of any 
type of pegging regime is, therefore, equivalent to the use of indirect inflation 
targeting. No single exchange rate regime is optimal for all nations at every time, but, 
nevertheless, it is usually considered that only a free float is sustainable on a long-term 
perspective18, since other strategies are unstable to exogenous shocks and ultimately 
collapse19. 
  
 The extreme case of the peg strategy is the currency board arrangement (CBA), 
which requires the official foreign exchange reserves to be –at least- equal to the amount 
of domestic currency issued (at a given fixed exchange rate): under a strict CBA, there is 
no actual domestic monetary policy, since both the monetary base and the level of 
interest rates are endogenously determined. Modified CBAs, though, may perform 
limited monetary policy actions, through the use of some types of CB-like instruments, 
like lender-of-last-resort (LLR) facilities or limited open-market operations20.  
 
 Usually, the choice of a CBA is linked to the need to give credibility to a 
stabilisation policy, or, in the case of Eastern Europe, to sheer inexperience in terms of 
conduct of monetary policy by the monetary authorities of these countries.  
 
 Among its stated advantages, a CBA entails automatic balance-of-payment 
adjustments (essentially in the same way that a gold standard exchange system would 
operate: in case of a deficit in the capital and current accounts, money supply is reduced, 
causing, ceteris paribus, the interest rate to rise, which will lead to i) reduced domestic 
                                                 
17It is estimated that, on average, only three years separated these two distinct phases: it was a much 
faster process that its counterpart in Western Europe (See Radzyner & Riesinger, 1998). 
18A full fixing (like the Euro) merges the national currency in a composite currency that floats itself: in 
these terms, a full fixing to the Euro is actually a floating regime, from the point of view of the 
aggregate. 
19The “shock-isolation” capabilities of a float regime can be intuitively demonstrated in a simple IS-
LM analytical framework (see Visser & Smits, 1995). Both foreign demand and foreign price shocks 
are cushioned by a floating exchange rate. Nevertheless, a foreign interest rate shock is not cushioned 
nor by a float neither by a peg, but the shock works on opposite directions (in a float, a fall in the 
“world” interest rates cause a capital inflow and an appreciation of the exchange rate, leading the IS 
curve to shift to the left; conversely, in a peg regime), but, in the case of the float, an activist monetary 
policy can be used as an effective instrument by the domestic policy maker. 
20A comprehensive discussion of alternative exchange rate regimes, and of several other subjects 
related to the integration of the Accession Countries into the euro area, can be found at most recent 
publication of the Forum Report on Economic Policy Initiative, “Monetary and Exchange Rate 
Policies, EMU and Central Eastern Europe”, CEPR, 1999. 
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activity and reduced imports, and to ii) an increase in foreign capital inflows,). It should 
also result in reduced inflation expectations (depending on the anchor currency chosen).  
 
Among its drawbacks, a CBA means not only the loss of monetary policy as a 
counter cyclical tool, but it can actually be procyclical (reinforcing economic booms and 
troughs). The lack of LLR features by the monetary authority increases both the short 
run probability and effects of financial sector crisis (regardless of the beneficial long run 
effects caused by the reduction of moral hazard). The need to perform active policy 
actions is heightened in periods of market instability, as was clearly the case in 
Eastern Europe after last year’s Russian crisis, and during the series of Baltic banking 
crisis of 1993-1995. A CBA also discourages the development of domestic money and 
capital markets21. Nevertheless, the most fundamental problem22 of a CBA lies in the 
question of its “exit strategy”. There is no clear optimal path from virtually the absence 
of monetary policy under a CBA regime towards a fully-fledged and even independent 
central bank. 
 
We present in the Table 2, next page, a summary description of current exchange 
rate arrangements used by the Accession Countries, and on Table 3, also next page, the 
estimated level of independence of their monetary authorities. On the Appendix, we 
provide a more detailed description of the recent monetary and exchange rate history of 
each individual Accession Country. 
 
 
                                                 
21Some specific examples could be supplied that contradict this last statement: the most famous case is, 
of course, Hong Kong, a CBA “country” which, even today, is one of the most dynamic financial 
markets in Asia. Nevertheless, its importance was partially derived from its special role as an 
intermediary in most financial transaction with the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
which may have more than compensated the disadvantages of the CBA system. The ongoing fall in 
importance of the Hong Kong market since its absorption into the PRC can be seen as supporting this 
conclusion. 
22Even other weaknesses of peg regimes are: 
-it is very difficult to determine the equilibrium exchange rate of a national currency in a peg; 
-the economy becomes vulnerable to shocks in the country to which the national currency is pegged; 
-the destabilising effects of capital inflows, when a misaligned fixed exchange rate violates the 
uncovered interest rate parity condition (by creating exploitable “risk-free” interest rate differentials), 
forcing the CB to costly and ultimately ineffective sterilisation operations. 
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Table 2: Exchange Rate Arrangements of the Accession Countries. 
 
Countries 
 
 
Currency 
 
Exchange 
Rate Regime 
 
Date of 
Introduction 
 
Bulgaria 
 
Lev 
Currency board regime (anchor 
is the euro). 
 
July 1997 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Koruna 
Managed float, with informal 
shadowing of the euro. 
 
May 1997 
 
Estonia 
 
Kroon 
Currency board regime (anchor 
on the Euro). 
 
June 1992 
 
 
Hungary 
 
 
Forint 
Sliding peg –0.3% monthly- 
with intervention bands (+/- 
2.25%) towards a basket made of 
euro and the USD (70%, 30%). 
 
 
March 1995 
 
Latvia 
 
Lats 
Peg with the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights, with 
intervention bands (+/- 1%). 
 
October 1993 
 
Lithuania 
 
Litas 
Currency board regime (the 
anchor is the USD). 
 
March 1994 
Poland Zloty Managed float with informal 
shadowing of the euro. 
April 2000 
Romania Leu Managed float with informal 
shadowing of the euro. 
August 1992 
Slovakia Koruna Managed float with informal 
shadowing of the euro. 
October 1998 
 
Slovenia 
 
Tolar 
Managed float with informal 
shadowing of the euro. 
 
October 1991 
Sources: Vinhas de Souza at al, 1999, ECB, EU, IMF. 
 
 
Table 3: Central Bank Independence in the Accession Countries. 
Countries Monetary Authority Status  Independence Index 
Bulgaria CBA. 
 
0.875(a) 
Czech Republic Legally Independent Central Bank *. 
 
0.875(a) 
Estonia CBA. 
 
1.000(a), 0.74(b) 
Hungary Legally Independent Central Bank *. 
 
0.312(a) 
Latvia Legally Independent Central Bank. 
 
0.85(b) 
Lithuania CBA. 
 
0.125(a), 0.82(b) 
Poland Legally Independent Central Bank. 
 
0.50(a) 
Romania Legally Independent Central Bank *. 0.50(a) 
Slovakia Non Independent Central Bank *. n.a (assume low) 
Slovenia Legally Independent Central Bank *. 
 
n.a (assume high) 
Sources: Vinhas de Souza at al, 1999, IMF, ECB and respective National Central Banks;  *: Lending to 
Government is still permitted; (a): Lougani and Sheets, 1997, (b): Äimä, 1998. 
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Äimä's index is based on the so-called "Cukierman's index", which can vary from 0 -no 
independence- to 1 -complete independence. Cukierman's is built as a linear combination of the 
following variables: 
 
1.CEO: a) Duration of term in office of CB's CEO; 
 b) Who appoints CB's CEO; 
 c) How CB's CEO can be dismissed; 
d) If  CB's CEO allowed to hold other offices. 
 
2.PF: a) Who formulates monetary policy; 
 b) Conflict resolution procedures with government; 
 c) CB's role in budget definition. 
 
3. OBJ: a) CB statutory objectives. 
 
4. LM: a) Limits on advances to government; 
 b) Limits on lending to government; 
 c) Who decides the terms of any lending; 
 d) Set of CB's potential borrowers; 
 e) Type of lending limits; 
 f) Maturity of loans; 
 g) Limits on interest rates; 
 h) Limits to primary market lending. 
 
Cukierman uses both (arbitrarily) weighted and simple averaged combinations of the variables 
above. Äimä uses a weighted combination of  .20 for 1), .15 for 2), .15 for 3), and varied weights for 
items in 4). Due to questions of comparability amongst his set of countries, Äimä estimates an 
alternative index that completely leaves out 4), re-weighting the remaining criteria. These are the 
values presented above. Lougani and Sheets use a similar procedure, but put more weight on 1) and 2), 
which explains the sharply different results for Estonia and Lithuania. 
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IV.  Empirical Results. 
 
 
We expect that the policy instruments governments use to manipulate the 
economy in election years depend upon both the exchange rate regime and whether or 
not the central bank is independent. If the exchange rate is flexible, then fiscal policy is 
ineffective and monetary policy is the only tool that governments can potentially use.  If 
central banks are politically independent from governments, then even this tool is not 
available. Conversely, if exchange rates are fixed monetary policy is an ineffective 
policy tool, and we anticipate that governments rely upon fiscal policy instead.  
 
To facilitate comparisons with the results obtained by Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000, Ibiden) for OECD and current EU member countries, we match the regression 
models as closely as possible. We use all ten Eastern European accession countries for 
the years 1990-99. There are several non-trivial problems in doing this regression 
analysis that anyone reading these results should consider. First, there are some clear 
data restrictions (see footnote 28 for some details). Some countries simply do not have 
figures to report for some years.  Second, ten years of data does not constitute a long 
time series. The results must therefore be considered fairly tentative. Yet one would also 
expect that, if anything, there was be a bias towards finding non-statistically significant 
results. Given the scale of the changes in East Europe over the decade there is likely 
plenty of “noise” in the regressions. 
 
  
Monetary Cycles 
 
 
Our regression equation for the monetary policy regression takes the form 
 
 
Mt = â0 + â1Electiont + â2CBI + â3Fixedt + â4Electiont*CBIt + â5Eelectiont*Fixedt  
+â5CBIt*Fixedt + â5Election*CBIt*Fixedt + â5mt-1,+Pricest-1 
 
 
The dependent variable is M1. Election is a dummy variable coded as “1” if a 
legislative election took place either in the current quarter or in the previous three 
quarters, CBI is a dummy variable for Central Bank Independence, Fixed is a dummy 
variable coded as “1” if the country maintained a fixed exchange rate in a given 
quarter. We include two control variables, m-t-1, or a one period lag of the money 
supply, and Pricest-1, which is a one period lag of the inflation rate. The central bank 
is presumably reacting to the latest information on prices when determining the 
current money supply. 
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Table 4: Monetary Political Business Cycles in Eastern Europe 1990-1999. 
Variable  Coefficient and Standard Error 
Variables of Interest  
Election .14** 
(.06) 
Central Bank Independent .002 
(.04) 
Fixed Exchange Rate -.02 
(.03) 
Election*Central Bank Independent -.20*** 
(.07) 
Election*Fixed Exchange Rate -.15** 
(.07) 
Election* Central Bank Independent*Fixed 
Exchange Rate 
.15* 
(.09) 
  
Control Variables  
Change in M1t-1 .64*** 
(.05) 
Pricest-1 .001** 
(.0001) 
Constant .08 
(.04) 
N=262, R-squared=0.79  * p<.1 ** p<.05, *** P<.01 
 
Regression with panel-corrected standard errors and country dummies (not reported). Alternative 
equations that include additional lags of the dependent variable and of Prices yield virtually identical 
results.  
 
Table 4a: Conditional Coefficients for Election under Different Configurations of 
Central Bank Independence and Exchange Rate Regime. 
  
Exchange Rates 
 
 
Central Bank Independence 
 
Flexible  
 
 
Fixed 
 
High 
 
-.05* 
(.035) 
 
 
.09 
 (.08) 
 
 
Low 
 
.14** 
 (.06) 
 
 
-.01 
(.03) 
 
 
* p<.1 ** p<.05, *** P<.01 
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Tables 4 and 4a above provide strong evidence that there have been regular 
monetary cycles in the considered Eastern European countries, but that these cycles 
depend upon the level of central bank independence as well as the exchange rate 
regime in place. Table 4 illustrates the standard regression. As expected, the two 
control variables (the lag of money supply as well as the lag in inflation) are both 
significant. Our variable of interest, Election, is both significant and carries the 
expected sign, but it alone cannot tell us all we would like to learn about the effects of 
elections. Because of the presence of interaction terms with both Central Bank 
Independence and with Fixed, the coefficient for Election in the regression indicates 
effects of elections on the money supply only when the other variables with which it 
interacts equals zero; in practical terms, this means only when central banks are 
dependent and when there are flexible exchange rates23. This result is perfectly 
consistent with the theory examined here, but it does not examine whether central 
bank independence and/or the exchange rate regime matter as well. 
 
Table 4a therefore computes the conditional coefficients for Election under 
different assumptions about central bank independence and the exchange rate. It is 
clear that the exchange rate regime plays a critical role. Regardless of the level of 
central bank independence, governments do not try to manipulate the economy 
through monetary expansions in pre-electoral periods when the exchange rate is fixed. 
The level of central bank independence, on the other hand, plays a role when the 
exchange rate is flexible, that is, under conditions where the Mundell-Fleming model 
tells us that monetary policy should be effective. When the bank is dependent upon 
the government, there is a strong increase in the money supply in pre-electoral 
periods. When the bank is independent, however, there is a tightening of the money 
supply (though smaller than the expansion under the alternative regime). 
 
The finding that monetary authorities tighten monetary policy during electoral 
periods when exchange rates are flexible is somewhat of a surprise; in Clark and 
Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) there is no statistically significant effect when the monetary 
authority is independent. While we do not have appropriate data to know for sure, we 
can speculate that newly created monetary authorities that were independent wanted 
to signal to markets that they were indeed independent from government decisions. 
Unlike with more established central banks in many OECD countries, markets would 
have little on which to judge the real level of independence of the new banks in 
Eastern Europe. Moreover, in a time a rapid change and seemingly fluid institutions, it 
would have been difficult for observers to know whether statutes dictating the 
independence of the central bank translated into an independent bank in practice. One 
visible way for banks to signal their independence would be for them to contract the 
money supply when one would expect dependent central banks to increase it.  
 
The results for the ten Eastern European Accession Countries are remarkably 
consistent with those presented for a data set of OECD countries. Monetary political 
business cycles exist only when the exchange rate is flexible and when the central 
bank is dependent upon the government. 
 
 
                                                 
23See Greene (1997) for a more detailed explanation of the proper interpretation of conditional 
coefficients.   
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Fiscal Cycles 
 
 
The second set of regressions examines whether or not there are fiscal cycles 
when exchange rates are fixed. We rely upon a modified version of our earlier 
regression equation, which now takes the following form: 
 
Deficit Level t = â0 + â1Electiont + â2Flexiblet + â3Election*Flexible 
+ â4Deficit Level t-1 + â5GDPt. 
 
The dependent variable is the yearly deficit level as a percentage of GDP. The 
coding of Election follows the coding that Franzese (1996) suggests for yearly data.  
Instead of coding a year in which there is a legislative election as “1” and a year in 
which there is not an election “0,” we consider the proportion of an election year that 
falls before the election as well as the proportion in the previous year. This means, for 
example, that for an election that is held on July 1 we code the current year as .5 and 
the previous year as 0.524. As Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) demonstrate, this 
more precise coding can reduce standard errors in regression equations in practice.  
Flexible is a dummy variable coded as “1” when there is flexible exchange rate in 
place. 
 
There are some issues both in terms of data and in terms of the regression 
equation that are important to consider before continuing.  The Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000, Ibiden) regression, which is in turn based on the widely-used Roubini and 
Sachs (1989) framework, uses changes in gross debt as its dependent variable instead 
of the current overall budget balance. Gross debt figures are generally preferable; they 
have more consistent accounting standards across countries than budget balances do.  
Yet gross debt figures are problematic for Eastern European Accession Countries for 
two reasons.  First, it is difficult to consider what “gross debt” meant for former 
Communist countries at the beginning of the 1990’s, while yearly balances are based 
on current figures and are reliable25.  Second, many more countries simply do not 
report gross debt figures than do not report yearly budget balances26. 
 
 Another set of issues concerns excluded political variables that appear in both 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) as well as in Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden).  Roubini 
and Sachs (1989, ibid) include an index for the type of government in office, and they 
find that one party majority governments have the lowest deficits27. In Eastern 
                                                 
24We code legislative elections only. Presidents generally have limited powers to manipulate the money 
supply or the budget, in the mostly parliamentary systems one finds across Eastern Europe. 
25As examples of difficulties with the data, the Baltic countries start their new lives as independent 
countries with a virtually null stock of debt, given that the political agreement that led to the Russian 
Federation inheriting all former “Soviet” assets also implied that it assumed all the liabilities, including 
public debt stocks. Also, the “division” of debt stocks between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia, and 
the Czech and Slovak republics, up on their respective separations, implied in non-economic reasons 
for their initial debt position (see Vinhas de Souza at al, 1999, Ibiden). 
26These restrictions on gross debt figures also make it difficult to compute expected interest payments 
on the debt, which is another independent variable that Roubini and Sachs (1989) include in their work. 
In empirical work, however, this variable is rarely significant (see Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1998 and 
1999, ibid). 
27In particular, they code a one-party majority government as a “0,” a two or three party majority 
government as a “1,” a four or five party majority government as a “2,” and a minority government as a 
“3.” They find that as the value of the index increases there is a statistically significant worsening of 
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Europe, however, the government types were virtually the same—all had some form 
of a parliamentary system, and all had some form of coalition government—so this 
variable is not relevant for the regressions here. Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) 
consider the effects as well of budgetary institutions by testing whether a strong 
finance minister or negotiated fiscal contracts eliminate fiscal political business 
cycles28. They find that either institution prevents fiscal political business cycles, 
much like central bank independence eliminates monetary cycles. Yet there is little 
data available on budget institutions in Eastern Europe, and to our knowledge no one 
has yet to publish a comparative study for these countries.   
 
Given these qualifications, we compute a regression that does include the 
relevant variables to test the hypothesis that governments engage in fiscal expansions 
shortly before elections. Table 5 presents evidence that such fiscal expansions are 
indeed present. The conditional coefficients indicate that budget deficit worsens 1.5% 
in pre-electoral periods in countries with fixed exchange rates. In countries with 
flexible exchange rates, there is a smaller move downward, but in this case the 
variable is not significant. 
 
 
Table 5: Monetary Political Business Cycles  
in Eastern Europe 1990-1999. 
Variables Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Variables of Interest  
Election -1.5** 
(.8) 
Flexible -.71 
(.61) 
Election*Flexible .76 
(1.39) 
Conditional 
Coefficients 
 
Election | Flexible=0 
 
-1.5** 
(.8) 
Election | Flexible=1 
 
-.78 
(1.1) 
  
Control Variables  
Intercept -.7 
(.5) 
d Deficitt-1 .46*** 
(.11) 
d Gdp .05 
(.03) 
         N=87, r-squared .27, * p<.1 ** p<.05, *** P<.01. 
                                                                                                                                            
changes in the gross debt burden in OECD countries. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) break up the index into 
dummy variables and find only that minority governments have an effect. Clark and Hallerberg (2000, 
Ibiden) also use Edin and Ohlsson’s (1991, ibid) formulation in their regression work. 
28For more details about these institutions see Von Hagen and Harden (1995), and Hallerberg and von 
Hagen (1998, 1999, Ibiden). 
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V. Implications of the Results for the Accession to the European Union. 
 
 
This paper confirms that the Accession Countries’ governments act very much 
like their OECD counterparts. They manipulate the economy before elections where 
possible, but the tools they use to do so depend upon the exchange rate regime and 
upon the institutional framework. If the country has a flexible exchange rate, the 
government relies upon monetary expansions, while if the country maintains a fixed 
exchange rate the government engages in fiscal expansions. Independent monetary 
authorities can eliminate such cycles in countries with flexible exchange rates. 
 
These results should be instructive to European Union policymakers who are 
considering the impact of European Union Enlargement on the European economy.  
As long as states continue to have flexible exchange rates and dependent central 
banks, there will likely be a political cycle that the money supply, and by implication 
the inflation rate as well, will follow. 
 
Over time, however, the ten Eastern European Accession Countries will all 
presumably join the euroarea. The road to EMU requires that the future member states 
implement truly independent central banks, and as such institutions are put in place, 
monetary political business cycles should disappear even before states become 
members of the euroarea. Once the Eastern European states become members, 
monetary policy will be set by the ECB and, for the purposes of this paper, exchange 
rates become irrevocably fixed. Like their Western European counterparts who are 
already part of the euroarea, the Accession Countries will give up their ability to 
manipulate monetary policy.   
 
Therefore, political business cycles can continue under EMU, but only in the 
form of the use of fiscal policy. European policymakers then have two problems to 
deal with: first, will fiscal political business cycles have any negative effects on the 
euroarea as a whole, and, second, if so, what measures can be taken to prevent such 
cycles? 
 
The initial evidence presented here indicates that states do have budget 
balances that are worse in pre-electoral periods than in electoral periods, but the scale 
of this cycle has been no worse than in the European Union members states before the 
Treaty of Maastricht. Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) estimate that the gross debt 
burden worsened anywhere between 1.5 and 3 percentage points of GDP in the EU 15 
that had fixed exchange rates during the time period 1981-92; the estimates here are 
that the budget balance worsened 1.5 percent of GDP in the 10 Eastern European 
states over a roughly comparable ten year period29. Given that the original members 
of the euroarea were able to proceed and to meet the Maastricht Criteria despite the 
presence of such cycles, there is no reason to believe that the cycles as they now exist 
in the Accession Countries should lead to any delays in EMU membership. 
 
Presuming that the size of the cycles remains roughly the same under EMU, 
whether the cycles themselves should be a concern once the Accession Countries join 
                                                 
29The figure for the Clark and Hallerberg (2000) coefficient is the coefficient when there were fixed 
exchange rates and no fiscal institution (i.e., strong finance minister or negotiated fiscal contracts) in 
place. 
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EMU is debatable. On the one hand, the overall size of the new economies as a 
proportion of total EU GDP shall remain small long after enlargement (even assuming 
real convergence towards the EU average GDP levels, this would truly be a 
generation-long process: see Vinhas de Souza at al, 1999), and the theoretical impact 
of the Euro membership on any politically motivated fiscal expansion in any one 
Accession Country should be tiny. Yet, it is possible to imagine that markets could 
react negatively if a country’s deficit crossed 3% of GDP and punish the whole Euro 
area. The reaction of the markets to the Russian default in 1998 indicates that negative 
news from even relatively small economies can have a broader impact. The Russian 
Federation’s economy is currently half of the size of the economy of the Federal 
Republic of Brazil, yet its default spread panic across the globe. Furthermore, even 
something smaller than a full default could still theoretically impact the external value 
of the Euro: outside observers may read any deviance from the 3% norm as an 
indication that all states have the ability to ignore the European Union’s fiscal rules. 
 
If individual member states and/or the European Union decide that such 
politically motivated fiscal cycles should be avoided, the next question is what can be 
done. As both Clark and Hallerberg (2000, Ibiden) and Vinhas de Souza at al (1999, 
Ibiden) indicate, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as it is currently constructed 
does not seem an adequate solution. The main problems are of timing of the process 
and, therefore, of its credibility. The SGP requires the European Commission to draft 
a recommendation to the Council of Ministers arguing that a state has an excessive 
deficit in order for the SGP’s procedure to punish states to be initiated. If the Council 
judges that a state does indeed have an excessive deficit, it must make a non-interest 
payment relative to the size of the deficit over 3% of GDP. It then has 10 months to 
make a correction. Now consider a country that begins a fiscal expansion in an 
election year. The European Commission is likely to make a recommendation when it 
receives final figures for the previous year’s accounts. In current EU countries these 
figures are generally available in March after the budget year. The punishment 
mechanism is therefore begun only after the elections have taken place, and, for an 
election held early in the year, any potential fines will not be levied until up to 18 
months after the election is over. Politicians for their part likely have short time 
horizons before elections; if they do not win, they will be out of office, while if they 
do win they will have time to make corrections to the budget in a non-electoral period. 
Therefore, the SGP, as it is now constructed, does not seem to us to be a credible 
constraint to prevent governments from overspending in election years. 
 
An alternative might be for governments to put in place domestic institutions, 
such as a “strong” finance minister or negotiated fiscal contracts, to lessen or 
eliminate the scale of fiscal political business cycles. Given that strong finance 
ministers tend to work best in countries with one-party governments –fortunately, 
currently a rarity in the European continent- or in countries where there are two 
clearly opposing blocks of parties (see Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999, Ibiden), it is 
likely that only negotiated fiscal contracts will be effective institutions capable of 
such, not only for the Accession Countries, but for the EU as a whole. 
 
Such fiscal contracts work as follows: the respective political parties that form 
the government negotiate binding budget targets for every ministry before portfolios 
are distributed to the parties in a coalition agreement. The negotiation of the targets 
ensures that the partners consider the full tax burden of their spending decisions, and 
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the process reduces the scope of the common pool resource problem, and along with it 
its deficit-increasing bias30. The European Union, for its part, could also encourage 
the governments of the member states –current and future- to establish such fiscal 
targets. It can also use the Commission’s monitoring of the member state performance 
through the SGP to provide regular information on a country’s budgetary 
performance, and also use its annual assessments of the Accession Countries for a 
similar porpoise. Yet it must be stressed that the coalition partners themselves should 
negotiate the detailed fiscal targets. While a general goal of a rough budget balance, 
as written into the SGP, is laudable, more detailed targets are needed to keep the 
individual ministries within the broader targets built into the SGP, and the 
Commission should not engage in such type of national micro-management. 
                                                 
30See Velasco, 1999 and Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Ibiden, for formal explanations that aim to 
formally establish the relationship between increases in the common pool resource problem and 
increases in the budget deficit. 
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Appendix: Recent Monetary and Exchange Rate History of the Individual 
Accession Countries. 
 
 
Bulgaria: Bulgaria uses a currency board regime, which linked its Lev to the DEM 
up to the end of 1999. It was introduced as part of a one-year stand-by IMF program 
in the Spring of 1997, which aimed to bring macroeconomic stabilisation into the 
country (one of its results was to almost immediately bring hyperinflation down from 
over 1,000% a year to around 5%). Starting from January 1999, the anchor currency 
of the arrangement became the Euro.  
 
Bulgaria went through a conventional transition stabilization program in the early 
1990s, which proved to be unsuccessful: neither disinflation nor external balance was 
reached. As a result, the IMF started to press the Bulgarian authorities, already by 
November 1996, to introduce a CBA, against the initial opposition of a skeptical BNB 
(Bulgarian National Bank). With the worsening of the crisis by the spring of 1997, 
this plan was finally accepted, as a part of a comprehensive package of stabilization 
reforms (including fiscal consolidation and wage and price reforms), and 
implemented by mid-1997. The CBA was installed upon the modified structure of the 
BNB, who phased out all its monetary operations, retaining only the minimum reserve 
requirement tool. The CBA-“entry” rate of the Lev was 1.000 to 1 DEM. 
 
Broadly speaking, the short-lived CBA experience in Bulgaria is so far successful: 
inflation has been substantially reduced, external balance has been achieved and the 
economic contraction seems to have bottomed out. Due to the perceived fragility of 
the situation, though, no serious planning concerning the replacement of the CBA has 
been yet developed. 
 
Czech Republic: The Czech Republic’s Koruna followed a peg to a DEM/USD 
basket until May 1997, which it was then forced to abandon after a speculative attack 
on its currency. The CNB (Ceska Narodni Banka or Czech National Bank) follows 
today a “dirty floating regime”, informally shadowing the DMark, while officially 
targeting domestic inflation rate31. As of the beginning of this year the Euro has 
become the informal target. 
 
Among the Eastern European countries endowed with a CB, the Czech Republic can 
be singled out for its ability to hold on to a fixed exchange rate regime for a record 
period of time. The CZK held its basket peg in a very narrow +/- 0.5 band from 
December 1990 until February 1996 (when the bands were extended to +/- 7.5%). The 
system survived the Czechoslovakia partition of early 1993 without disturbances.  
 
The monetary policy intermediate target evolved from the domestic credit volume 
target (1990) to a net domestic assets in the banking system target (1991/92), to, 
                                                 
31The CNB has indicated several times that the integration of the Koruna in the Euro framework is one of 
its aims. Nevertheless, the domestic situation, since the crash of the currency in 1997, is clearly its main 
short run concern. As an aside, the Czech Republic is a good example of the fragility of apparently 
positive macroeconomic developments in a transition economy that lacked adequate micro foundations. 
Those weaknesses were “¼ for all too long hidden behind a curtain of macroeconomic success” (see 
Buch, C., 1999). 
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finally, a M2 (money and quasi money) “corridor”. The initial phase of blunt direct 
policy instruments (rate and credit ceilings) lasted for only two years, essentially 
ending by October 1992. 
 
The initial choice of a “nominal anchor” foreign exchange regime was actually 
defined by the stabilization program jointly designed with the IMF in 1990, with the 
peg being set after a substantial cumulative “entry” devaluation of 95%. This actually 
explains the longevity of the peg: that devaluation deliberately substantially 
undershoot the “equilibrium” entry level, creating a “cushion” that permitted a 
persistent real appreciation of the Koruna to be absorbed without changing the parity. 
The negative effects of that were i) a very high initial adjustment contraction of the 
GDP – a 16% fall in 1991 - and ii) the undervaluation “cushion” reduced incentives to 
real adjustment (i.e., the “nominal anchor” wasn't binding), with the mounting 
pressures spectacularly exposed by the currency crisis of 1997.  
 
Classically, the violation of the uncovered interest rate parity condition led to the 
increase in short term foreign capital inflows between 1993 and 1995 (when they 
reached an amazing 17.4% of the Czech GDP), leading to equally classical and  costly 
sterilisation interventions by the CNB (the costs were estimated to equal 0.5 of GDP 
in 1995 alone) and the subsequent fall of the inflows in 1996-97, when the situation 
was perceived to be increasing unsustainable, finally leading to the breakdown of the 
system. 
 
Estonia: Estonia has a currency board system administered by the Eesti Pank (Bank 
of Estonia, BoE) which linked its Kroon to the Deutsch Mark by a rate of EEK 8 to 
DEM 1. Starting from 1 January 1999 the Estonian Kroon was fixed against the Euro, 
at the same conversion rate of the DEM in the common currency32. 
 
When adopting a CBA in mid-1992, as a component of a stabilization and reform 
package, Estonia’s main aims were stability and credibility. The Ruble was replaced 
by the Kroon. The new, two-tier banking system was centered, from the very 
beginning, around a currency board type of monetary authority. Its main function is 
the acquisition of hard currency in the interbank forex market. Nevertheless, it also 
has some monetary policy tools: central bank bills (issued since 1993, but in very 
small amounts), (low) reserve requirements and (unused) standing deposit facilities. 
No LLR instruments are available, and the result of the 1992/94 banking crisis was 
that the number of banks operating in the country was reduced to a third of its original 
figure. Capital movements were fully liberalized already by late 1993.  
 
Due to increasing capital inflows (parallel to an increasing trade deficit) and an 
economy near overheating, the real exchange rate has experienced that familiar peg 
phenomenon, a substantial real appreciation. The lack of a more sophisticated set of 
macro economic policy tools, which could enable the monetary authority to cool 
down the economy and achieve a sustainable external balance, may place some 
doubts on the long-term prospects of the CBA. 
                                                 
32The Eesti Pank, in its last “Statement of the Board” before the introduction of the Euro, dated 10/12/98, 
declared that the introduction of the Euro and the related change of reference currency for the peg had no 
other implications in terms of monetary or exchange rate policy. 
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Hungary: The Hungarian Forint is, since 1995, in a crawling peg with a variable pre-
announced devaluation rate (currently of 0.4% a month) towards a DEM/USD basket 
(with weights of, respectively, 70% and 30%), within a +/- 2.25% intervention band. 
This basket has been converted, since January 1, 1999, into an Euro/USD one, with 
the same relative shares. The MNB (Magyar Nemzeti Bank or National Bank of 
Hungary (NBH)) and the Hungarian Government have already announced their 
intention to switch to a full (100%) Euro crawling peg by January 1, 2000 (See MNB, 
1998). 
 
The two-tier banking system was established already in 1987 (Hungary was an early 
reformer), but the current legal framework for the NBH was introduced in 1991 (with 
several additions since). It defined the NBH’s aims as safeguarding the internal and 
external purchasing power of the Hungarian currency. This implied the problem –
clear between 1991 and 1994, the first phase of the transition- of too many final goals 
for monetary policy, which included both inflation control or external balance. In 
practical terms, policy emphasis shifted from one to the other. This problem was 
compounded by a postponement of fiscal adjustment. When the fiscal deficit reached 
9% of the GDP in 1995, the situation became unsustainable, resulting in the 
adjustment program of March of that year. This also caused the clear selection of 
price stability as the ultimate goal of monetary policy, with the nominal exchange rate 
being used as an intermediate target: the Forint was devalued by 9% and the current 
pre-announced crawling band system introduced, as a replacement of the previous 
adjustable peg to a DEM/USD basket (with a 50%/50% composition).  
 
The pre-announced devaluation aims to undershoot forward-looking inflation 
expectations, taking into consideration productivity improvements and underpinning 
desinflation. The sustainability of such a regime, of course, depends on the 
maintenance of fiscal balance and on a sensible wage policy. Currently, the country 
seems to be edging towards some sort of dirty floating regime. 
 
Latvia: Latvia uses a peg regime, through which the Lats, the currency which 
replaced the temporary Latvian Ruble or “Rublis” (which was the country first step of 
monetary independence from the “Ruble Zone”, and lasted from May 1992 to October 
1993), is linked to the IMF’s fiduciary account unit, the Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR, which is actually basket of currencies of IMF member countries). The SDR’s 
weights actually roughly reflect Latvia external trade composition (only a third of its 
foreign trade is with the Euroarea), but another reason for this choice is the fact the 
creation of the Latvian currency was one of the results of the IMF-backed stabilisation 
program of 1992 (see Nissinen, 1999). There are no immediate plans to change this 
arrangement (see Repse, 1998). 
 
The Bank of Latvia (Latvijas Banka) uses the exchange rate peg to the SDR as an 
intermediate target and net domestic assets as an operational target. As a full-fledged 
central bank, it has the standard set of indirect monetary policy tools: repurchase 
agreements (“repos”), a treasury bill market, reserve requirements (uniformly held at 
the 8% introduced in July 1993), and also LLR facilities, which it chose not to use 
during the 1994/95 banking crisis, arguably the most severe of the wave of Baltic 
financial sector crisis in the first half of the 1990s: the 4 major banks among the 17 
that collapsed accounted for 46% of all private deposits, and that in an environment 
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without deposit insurance. The Bank of Latvia decided instead to use that opportunity 
to introduce sweeping regulatory and prudential reforms to consolidate the financial 
sector. 
 
Peculiarly, the Latvijas Banka, in spite of deviating in the surface from its Baltic 
neighbours on the use of a CBA strategy, has consistently emulated at least one 
feature of it, namely, it aims to keep near 100% of its domestic liabilities covered by 
foreign reserves (the lower point was reached exactly during the banking crisis period, 
when they reached 60-70%: see Äimä, 1998). 
 
Lithuania: Lithuania uses a modified currency board arrangement, introduced in 
1994, which pegs the Lithuanian Litas to the USD. Its monetary authority, the BoLi 
(Lietuvos Bankas, Bank of Lithuania) has available to it certain types of market based 
instruments, and it also has a clear strategy to evolve towards a full-fledged CB.  
 
Lithuania, like its two Baltic neighbors, reappeared as an independent state in the 
early 1990s (in modern times, it had experienced only a brief period of autonomy 
from 1919 to 1940), with the collapse of the Soviet Union, to which it had been 
annexed after the military invasion of 1940.  
 
The Ruble was initially replaced, as in Latvia, by an interim coupon currency issued 
by the newly created BoL, from May to October 1992, and them by the Talonas, 
which was, on its turn, replaced by the Litas in June 1993. The Talonas, initially in a 
float regime, lost over 50% of its value between its introduction and April 1993. Some 
exchange rate stability was regained with the introduction of the Litas.  Nevertheless, 
the government, with the support of the IMF, decided to press for the constitution of 
an Estonian-type CBA already in October 1993, against the will and the advice of the 
BoL.  
 
The CBA was finally introduced in April 1994 –upon the unchanged administrative 
structure of the BoL33. Its CBA, therefore, since the very beginning, have to be 
                                                 
33It must be noted that some authors (see Äimä, 1998) have a much more negative interpretation of the 
monetary policy developments in Lithuania and the very institutional design of the Lithuanian 
monetary authority, linking them to, in essence, a power struggle within the Lithuanian government.  
 
According to this interpretation, the institution of the CBA increased, in practical terms, the margin of 
maneuver of the government in terms of economic policy, due to the elimination of a comp eting center 
of authority –the BoLi- with increasing domestic standing: this is possible because, almost uniquely 
among CBAs, the exchange rate of the Litas can be changed by a mere government decision, albeit one 
made in consultation with the BoLi (this has led some authors to question if the Lithuanian 
arrangement deserves to be called a CBA at all: see Äimä, ibid). Such a situation is actually the 
opposite of the expected outcome of a CBA.  
  
Historically, the institution of the CBA was imposed upon the BoLi by a government decision against 
the Bank’s advise, after it had achieved the stabilization of the Litas and without any real modifications 
of its internal structure. The high turn over of BoLi’s Governors –seven since its founding in 1990, two 
of them temporary ones- grants it the lowest score in actual independence among the Baltic monetary 
authorities, according to the “Cukierman” index. Some of them were dismissed due to direct conflicts 
with the Lithuanian government (most famously in 1993, when the them Governor refused to allow the 
use of the BoLi profits to finance the government’s budget; the following Governor, after an interim 
administration and already under the CBA legislation, even allowed the use of the BoLi’s reserves as 
collateral for loans provided by private banks to the government). 
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characterized as a modified CBA, since some CB instruments (like reserve 
requirements and short term credit facilities, including for LLR operations: all those 
tools were necessary and duly used during the great 1995/96 banking crisis) were 
preserved34. 
 
The Lithuanian strategy, presented at the “Monetary Policy Programme for 1997-
1999”, is to move towards a full-fledged CB. It has three phases: during the first one 
(already under way), the aim is to introduce and develop of open market operations 
and a Lombard facility with the currency board still in existence (1997-1999); during 
the second phase (1999-2000), the “Law on the Credibility of the Litas” is to be 
amended; the third and final phase (2000-onwards) would aim to link the Litas to the 
Euro or, temporarily, to a basket that would include it.  At that moment, the BoL plans 
to be prepared to meet the requirements of ERM-2 membership 
. 
Recently, the BoLi has partially modified the timetable described above (see Bank of 
Lithuania, 1999). It has resolved to:  
 
a) not to carry out the planned re-peg of the Litas exchange rate towards the euro in 
2000;  
b) to re-peg the Litas directly to the Euro in the second half of 2001, skipping an 
intermediate peg to a USD/Euro currency basket.  
 
The pegging of the Litas directly to the Euro is defended on the basis that “no 
principal decisions concerning the Litas exchange rate will be taken in 1999-2000; 
therefore, in the future, this plan will have to be carried out faster”. Additionally, such 
a peg would be more transparent and easily understood by the agents, and, at the same 
time, would send a clear signal to them to increase the use of the euro in their 
international settlements in trade with the European Union. 
 
Poland: The Polish Zloty was in crawling-peg against a basket of currencies, which 
was modified in early 1999 into a Euro/USD basket (the former basket included the 
Deutsch Mark, the American Dollar, the Pound Sterling, the French and Swiss 
Francs), weighted with, respectively, 65% and 35%. A float of the currency was 
finally introduced in April 2000.  
 
The choice of a peg exchange rate regime in Poland was linked to the need to fight 
hyperinflation in the country in 1989/90 (i.e., the monetary/exchange rate policy was 
a part of a short-term stabilization program), at the moment that the two-tier banking 
system was introduced into the country. Additionally, the limited nature of 
instruments available at that time to the NBP (Narodowy Bank Polski or National 
Bank of Poland) - ceilings, reserve requirements, “moral suasion”- conditioned the 
choice for this policy option.  
 
A very high liquidity in the banking system – caused by an unexpectedly positive 
situations in the balance of payments and the government budget- led to the 
imposition of very heavy reserve requirements of 30% in 1990 (the registered trade 
surplus was also a result of the substantial undershooting of the “entry level” 
                                                 
34Almost uniquely among CBAs, the exchange rate of the Litas can be changed by a Government 
decision, albeit one made in consultation with the BoL. This has led some authors to question if the 
Lithuanian arrangement deserves to be called a CBA at all (see Äimä, 1998). 
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exchange rate chosen for the initial peg with the USD in 1990). Nevertheless, the 
sharp economic downturn characteristic of the initial stage of transition, experienced 
by Poland in 1991, led to another devaluation in May of that year and to the 
introduction of a crawling peg of the PLZ to a currency basket (USD, DEM, GBP, 
FRF, CHF) by October. 
 
The 1992/95 period is one of slow desinflation with a parallel development of 
monetary instruments: money market operations and refinancing facilities became the 
most important policy tools. Capital flows were already highly liberalized by 1992. 
Additionally, the initial fall in GDP turned into sustainable export-led growth by 
1993, albeit with high unemployment. The classical problem of foreign capital 
inflows and monetary expansion that developed was initially dealt with by the 
combined reduction of the crawl rate and sterilisation operations, and, in May 1995, 
by the introduction of a crawling band regime with +/- 7% intervention bands, 
increasing the ability of the NBP to perform active monetary policy while retaining 
the anchor features of the regime. 
 
Romania: Romania uses a dirty float regime since 1992, with the National Bank of 
Romania (NBR) –the Romanian Central Bank- intervening in the market to support 
the Leu in a discretionary fashion.  
 
The country has been plagued by systematic macro instability since the beginning of 
transition process. Even now, high and persistent inflation –making it the exception 
amongst all the Accession countries, incomplete privatisation, internal and external 
imbalances are all observed. This seems to be at least partially related to the 
particularly brutal way in which the formal authoritarian regime was overthrow there, 
and on the effects of this, even today, on the construction of a working political 
consensus amongst agents. 
 
In institutional terms, several problems also remain. For instance, even after the new 
1998 Central Banking law, with established that the NBR’s “key objective is to ensure 
the stability of domestic currency with a view to maintaining price stability”, which 
also granted the bank a larger degree of autonomy, the financing of the government is 
still permitted 
 
Slovakia: Slovakia used a peg regime with intervention bands, through which the 
National Bank of Slovakia (Národná Banka Slovenska, NBS) pegged its Koruna to a 
basket made of the DEM and the USD (with weights of, respectively, 60% and 40%). 
The intervention bands had to be progressively widened since the introduction of the 
regime in 1996, from +/- 1.5% to +/- 7.0%. After a series of speculative attacks, the 
NBS was finally forced to abandon the peg and float the Koruna, in October 1998. 
 
The Slovakian central bank was created only in 1992, and entered into operation in 
1993, after the break up of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. Its main objective 
is the stability of the Slovakian Crown (“Koruna”, SKK). The exchange rate regime 
was initially a fixed peg to a basket (USD, DEM, ATS, CHF and FRF, with weights 
of 49.06%, 36.16%, 8.07%, 3.79% and 3.79%, respectively) in the Czech model, 
accompanied by a domestic M2 growth target (“supporting economic growth” was 
added to its list of aims in 1995) as intermediate target.  The currency basket of the 
peg was modified to USD/DEM in July 14, 1994 (40%/60%).  
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The period 1993/1994 corresponds to the stabilization years for its new SKK, with a 
relatively small devaluation “entry” of 10% in 1993. The set of instruments initially 
used was more blunt than its Czech counterpart (credit limits, restrictions to the 
internal convertibility of the currency – which only became “Article VIII” compatible, 
i.e., convertible according to IMF requirements in October, 1, 1995 - and reserve 
ratios), in spite of the availability of the discount and Lombard rates and repo and 
Treasury bill auctions instruments since 1993.  In 1996, to deal with the usual 
problem of capital inflows in peg regimes, reserve requirements were raised to an 
uniform level of 9%, the SKK bands were widened from 1.5 to +/- 3% and then to +/- 
5%. 
 
Slovenia: Slovenia uses a float system for its Tolar (created in 1991), administered by 
the Bank of Slovenia (Banka Slovenije, BoS), with the BoS targeting a domestic 
money aggregate (M3: money, quasi-money and time deposits), and informally 
shadowing the DEM. This system has been very successful so far (in spite of 
widespread indexation schemes in the country, specially of wages and interest rates, 
which have also a ceiling, set by a cartel of banks, some of them still state-owned: see 
Pautola, 1998), delivering both desinflation and external balance, with only minor 
exchange rate adjustments: during 1996/97, the Tolar experienced a nominal 
depreciation of 6.9% percent to the DEM. 
 
The BoS is a full-fledged central bank, created as an independent entity after the 
separation of the country from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. (It 
already existed even before independence, since the former Bank of Yugoslavia actually 
operated as a federation of regional central banks, uncannily similar to the ECB.) 
 
 28
Bibliography 
 
 
Äimä, K., “Central Bank Independence in the Baltic Countries”, Review of 
Economies in Transition, n° 3, Suomen Pankki (Bank of Finland), 1998. 
 
Avramov, R., “The Role of a Currency Board in Financial Crises: The Case of 
Bulgaria”, Discussion Papers, DP/6/1999, Bulgarian National Bank, 1999. 
 
Backé, P. & Radzyner, O., “The Introduction of the Euro: Implications for Central 
and Eastern Europe-The Case of Hungary and Slovenia”, Österreichische 
Nationalbank, 1998. 
 
Baldwin, R., Francois, J. & Portes, R., “The Costs and Benefits of Eastern 
Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe”, in Economic 
Policy, 1997. 
 
Banka Slovenije, “Annual Report 1997”, Bratislava, 1998. 
 
Bank of Lithuania, “Monetary Policy Programme for 1997-1999”, Vilnius, 1997. 
 
Bayoumi, T & Eichengreen, B., “Shocking Aspects of the European Monetary 
Unification”, in Giavazzi, F & Torres, F. (eds), The Transition to Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Benassy-Quere, A. & Lahreche-Revil, A., “The Euro as a Monetary Anchor in the 
CEEC’s”, 1998, mimeo. 
 
Borish, M., Ding, W. & Noël, M., “On the Road to EU Accession: Financial Sector 
Development in Central Europe”, World Bank Discussion Paper, n° 345, 
1996. 
 
Breuss, F., “The Economic Consequences of a Large EMU-Results of 
Macroeconomic Model Simulations”, in European Integration Online Papers, 
v. 1, n° 10, 1997, Vienna, Austria. 
 
Buch, C. & Döpke, J., “Real and Financial Integration in Europe-Evidence for the 
Accession States and for the Pre-Ins”, Kiel Working Papers, nº 917, 1999. 
 
Cecchetti, C., “Central Bank Policy Rules: Conceptual Rules and Practical 
Considerations”, in Current Issues in Monetary Economics, Wagner, H. (ed.), 
Physica Verlag, 1998.” 
 
Ceska Narodni Banka, “Minutes of the CNB Board Meeting”, Prague, several 
numbers. 
 
_________________, "Annual Report", Prague, 1998. 
 
Christoffersen, P. & Wescott, R., "Is Poland Ready for Inflation Targeting?", 
WP/99/41, IMF, 1999. 
 29
 
Clark, W. & Hallerberg, M., “Strategic Interaction between Monetary and Fiscal 
Actors under Full Capital Mobility”, currently a “Revise and Resubmit” at the 
American Political Science Review, 2000. 
 
Clark, W. & Reichert, U., “International and Domestic Constraints on Political 
Business Cycle Behavior”, International Organization, n° 57, pp. 87-120, 
1998. 
 
Czech Government, “Economic Strategy of Joining the European Union: Starting Points 
and Outlines of Solutions”, Prague, 1998. 
 
Daviddi, R. & Ilzkovitz, F., “The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Major 
Challenges for Macro-economic Policies and Institutions of Central and 
Eastern European Countries”, in European Economic Review, pp. 671-680, n° 
41, 1997. 
 
Dedek, O., “Echoing the European Monetary Integration in the Czech Republic”, in  
Inclusion of Central European Countries in the European Monetary Union, 
De Grauwe, P. & Lavrac, V. (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. 
 
De Grauwe, P. & Aksoy, Y., “Are Central European Countries Part of the European 
Optimum Currency Areas?”, in  Inclusion of Central European Countries in 
the European Monetary Union, De Grauwe, P. & Lavrac, V. (eds.), Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999. 
 
De Grauwe, P., “Paradigms of Macroeconomics Policy for the Open Economy”, in M. 
Fratianni et al., (eds.), Macroeconomic Policy in Open Economies, Handbook 
of Comparative Economic Policies, v. 5, Greenwood Press, 1997. 
 
Dornbusch, R., Favero, C. & Giavazzi, F., “Immediate Challenges for the European 
Central Bank”, Economic Policy, April, 1998. 
 
Dvorsky, S., Backé, P. & Radzyner, O. “The 1998 Reports of the European 
Commission on Progress by Candidate Countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe”, Focus on Transition, v. 2, ONB, Vienna, 1998. 
 
Edin, P. & Ohlsson, H., “Political Determinants of Budget Deficits: Coalition Effects 
Versus Minority Effects”, European Economic Review, v. 35 (December), pp. 
1597-1603, 1991. 
 
Eesti Pank, “Statement of the Board”, Tallinn, several numbers. 
 
European Central Bank, “Annual Report 1997”, Frankfurt am Main, Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 1998. 
 
European Commission, “Composite Paper”, EC, Brussels, 1999. 
 
European Commission, “Composite Paper”, EC, Brussels, 1998. 
 
 30
European Commission, “Agenda 2000”, 1997. 
 
European Commission, “One Market, One Money: An Evaluation Of The Potential 
Benefits And Costs Of Forming An Economic And Monetary Union”, European 
Economy, n° 44, October, 1990. 
 
Filosa, R., “Monetary Policy Framework in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Relevance of Other Countries’ Experience”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 
1996. 
 
Fischer, S., Sahay, R. & Végh, C., “How Far is Eastern Europe from Brussels?”, IMF 
Working Papers, WP/98/53, IMF, 1998. 
 
Fischer, S., “Central Bank Independence Revisited”, American Economic Review, 
May, 1995. 
 
Franzese, R., “The Political Economy of Public Debt: An Empirical Examination of 
the OECD Post-war Experience”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1996. 
 
Freytag, A., “Getting Fit for EMU: A Currency Board for Poland”, Institut für 
Wirtshaftpolitik, Germany, 1998. 
 
Gaspar, V. & Pereira, A., “The Impact of Financial Integration and Unilateral Public 
Transfers on Investment and Growth in EC Capital-Importing Economies”, 
Journal of Development Economics, 1995. 
 
Greene, W., Econometric Analysis. 3rd Edition. Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice 
Hall, 1997. 
 
Hallerberg, M. & von Hagen., J., “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and 
Budget Deficits within the European Union”, in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal 
Performance, Poterba, J. & von Hagen, J. (eds.), University of Chicago Press, 
pp. 209-232, 1999. 
 
Hallerberg, M. & von Hagen., J., “Electoral Institutions and the Budget Process”, in 
Democracy, Decentralisation and Deficits in Latin America, Fukasaku, K. & 
Hausmann, R. (eds.), OECD, pp. 65-94, 1998. 
 
Halpern, L. & Wyplosz, C., “Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Transition Economies”, 
IMF Working Papers, WP/96/125, IMF, 1996. 
 
Hibbs, D., The American Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987. 
 
Hibbs, D., “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." American Political Science 
Review, v. 71 (December), pp.1467-1487, 1977. 
 
Horvath, J. & Jonas, J., “Exchange Rates Regimes in The Transition Economies: Case 
Study of the Czech Republic 1990-1997”, ZEI Working Papers, B11, 1998. 
 31
 
Hrnèíø, M., “Monetary Policy in the Czech Republic: Strategies, Instruments and 
Transmission Mechanisms”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1996. 
 
Hutchinson, M., “Northern Light: Do Optimal Currency Area Criteria Explain Nordic 
Reluctance to Join EMU?”, CEPR, 1998. 
 
International Monetary Fund, “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions”, 1998. 
 
__________________________, “Country Staff Reports”, Several, 1997, 1998. 
 
Janackova, S., “Convergence for European Union Accession: Challenges for Czech 
Monetary Policy”, in Prague-Economic-Papers, v. 7, nº 1, 1998. 
 
Kaser, M., “The Eastern Länder as a Transition Economy”, in East Germany’s 
Economic Development Since Unification, Hölscher, J. & Hochberg, A. (eds), 
McMillan, 1998. 
 
Keech, W., Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Kokoszczyñski, R., “Monetary Policy in Poland: Strategies, Instruments and 
Transmission Mechanisms”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1996. 
 
Kopits, G., “Implications of EMU for Exchange Rate Policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, WP/99/9, IMF, 1999. 
 
Korhonen, I., “A Few Observations on the Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies of 
Transition Economies”, Review of Economies in Transition, n° 3, Suomen 
Pankki (Bank of Finland), 1997. 
 
Krzak, M., “Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: From Plan to Market-Selected Issues”, 
Österreichische Nationalbank, 1998. 
 
_________ & Schubert, A., “The Present State of Monetary Governance in Central 
and Eastern Europe”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1998. 
 
Kuus, T., “Estonia's EMU Prospects”, in Russian and eastern European Financial 
Trade, v. 34, nº 5, 1998. 
 
Lavrac, V., “Lecture on Slovenia: Monetary Policy and Monetary Integration into the 
EU”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1999. 
 
Lehmussaari, M., “A Statement”, Bank of Estonia, 1999. 
 
Lipschitz, L., “Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: Strategies, 
Instruments and Transmission Mechanisms”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 
1996. 
 
 32
Loungani, P. & Sheets, N., “Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Growth in 
Transition Economies”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 29, n° 3, 
1997. 
 
Lucas, R., “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique”, in Brunner, Karl, and Alan 
Meltzer, Eds.  The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series Public Policy, pp. 19-46, 1976. 
 
Lythe, C., “What Does the Experience of German Monetary Union Tell Us About the 
Theory of Monetary Union”, International Review of Applied Economics, v. 
9, n° 2, 1995. 
 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, “Monetary Policy Guidelines 1999”, MNB, Budapest, 1998. 
 
Makúch, J., “Monetary Policy in Slovakia: Strategies, Instruments and Transmission 
Mechanisms”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1996. 
 
Matos, J., “Recent Experience with Successful Transformation-The Case of 
Portugal”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1996. 
 
MacRae, C., “A Political Model of the Business Cycle”, Journal of Political 
Economy, v. 85 (April), pp. 239-263, 1977. 
 
Ministério das Finanças, “O Impacto do Euro na Economia Portuguesa”, Lisboa, 1998 
 
Mundell, R., “Updating the Agenda for Monetary Union”, in Optimum Currency 
Areas, New Analytical and Policy Developments, Bleijer, M., Frenkel, J., 
Leiderman, L. & Razin, A. (eds.), IMF, 1997. 
 
____________“A Theory of An Optimum Currency Area”, American Economic 
Review, pp. 657-665, 1961 
 
Narodowy Bank Polski, “Monetary Policy Guidelines for 1999”, NBP, Warsaw, 
1998. 
 
____________________ “Medium Term Strategy of Monetary Policy (1999-2003)”, 
NBP, Warsaw, 1998. 
 
Nemenyi, J., “Challenges of Monetary Policy in the run-up to European Union 
Accession”, 1998, mimeo. 
 
___________“Monetary Policy in Hungary: Strategies, Instruments and Transmission 
Mechanisms”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1996. 
 
Nissinen, M., “Latvia’s Transition to a Market Economy”, MacMillan, 1999. 
 
 
Nordhaus, W., “The Political Business Cycle”, Review of Economic Studies, v. 42 
(April), pp 169-190, 1975. 
 
 33
Oatley, T., “How Constraining is Mobile Capital? The Partisan Hypothesis in an 
Open Economy”, American Journal of Political Science, 1999. 
 
Orlowski, W., “Real Exchange Rates and Growth After the EU Accession: The 
Problems of Transfer and Capital Inflow Absorption”, in EU Enlargement and 
its Macroeconomic Effects in Eastern Europe, Gabrisch, H. & Pohl, R. (eds.), 
MacMillan, 1999. 
 
Pagan, A., “Three Economic Methodologies: A Critical Appraisal”, Journal of Economic 
Survey, 1987. 
 
Pautola, N., "Optimal Currency Areas, EMU and the Outlook for Eastern Europe", 
Review of Economies in Transition, n° 1, Suomen Pankki (Bank of Finland), 
1998. 
 
___________& Backé, P., “Currency Boards in Central and Eastern Europe: Past 
Experience and Future Perspectives”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 1998. 
 
Polanski, Z., “Poland and International Financial Turbulence of The Second Half of 
The 1990s”, mimeo, 1999. 
 
__________ “The Challenge of European Monetary Integration and the Polish 
Monetary Policy”, in Meeting the Converge Criteria of EMU: Problems of the 
Countries in Transition, Polish Economic Society, Warsaw, 1997. 
 
Radzyner, O. & Reisinger, S., “Central Bank Independence in Transition: Legislation 
and Reality in Central and Eastern Europe”, Österreichische Nationalbank, 
1998. 
 
Repse, E., “The Implications of EMU for the Policies of the Bank of Latvia”, Speech 
by the Governor of the Bank of Latvia, Vienna, 1998 (a). 
 
________ “The Implications of Euro for Central and Eastern Europe”, Speech by the 
Governor of the Bank of Latvia, Lisbon, 1998(b). 
 
Ribnikar, I., “Monetary Arrangements and Exchange Rate Regime in a Small 
Transitional Economy (Slovenia)”, in Inclusion of Central European 
Countries in the European Monetary Union, De Grauwe, P. & Lavrac, V. 
(eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. 
 
Roubini, N. & Sachs, J., “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in 
the Industrial Democracies”, European Economic Review, v. 33 (May), pp. 
903-933, 1989. 
 
Šarkinas, R., “Lithuania: A Monetary Strategy for EU Accession”, Speech by the 
Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, Bank of Lithuania, Vilnus, 
1999. 
 
Tufte, E., The Political Control of the Economy, Princeton University Press, 1978. 
 
 34
Tullio, G., “Exchange rate Policy of Central European Countries in the Transition to 
European Monetary Union”, in Inclusion of Central European Countries in 
the European Monetary Union, De Grauwe, P. & Lavrac, V. (eds.), Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999. 
 
Velasco, A., “A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms.” 
In Poterba, James, and Jürgen von Hagen, (eds.), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal 
Performance, University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
 
Vinhas de Souza, L., & Ledrut, E., “An Optimal Currency Area Estimation for the 
Accession Countries”, paper prepared for the NAKE Research Day 2000, 
Dutch Central Bank (DNB), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2000. 
 
__________________, “Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes for pre-EMU 
Integration: A Preliminary Estimation for Selected Accession Countries in 
Eastern Europe”, proceedings the Meeting “Financial Crises in Transition 
Countries: Recent Lessons and Problems yet to Solve”, Institute for Economic 
Research (IWH), Germany, 2000. 
 
__________________, Eden, H., Ledrut, E., Groot , A., and Romijn, G., “EMU and 
Enlargement: A Review of Policy Issues”, Economic Affairs Series, Working 
Paper ECON 117 EN, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, 
Luxembourg, 1999. 
 
_________________, and Hölscher, J., “Exchange Rates Links and Strategies of New 
EU Entrants”, forthcoming in The Journal of European Integration. 
 
_________________, “The Portuguese Legal Framework for Foreign Direct 
Investment”, in Dimon, D., Tomlinson, A. & Nichols, S. (eds), 
Competitiveness in International Business, vol. I, A & M. University, USA, 
1996. 
 
Walsh, C., “Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers”, American Economic Review, v. 
85, n° 1, March 1995. 
 
Wdowinski, P. & van Aarle, B.,”EMU and its Effects: The Case of Poland. A Study 
for Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates”, mimeo, 1998. 
 
Von Hagen, J. & Harden, I., “Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal 
Discipline.” European Economic Review, v. 39, pp. 771-779, 1994. 
 
